INTRODUCTION
All knowledge and wisdom ultimately flow from practices, but their organization differs among the different streams of knowledge. Folk knowledge is maintained, transmitted, and augmented almost entirely in the course of applying it in practice; it lacks a formal, institutionalized process for handling. Folk ecological knowledge and wisdom are therefore highly sensitive to changing relationships between people and their ecological resource base. Today, both are eroding at a fast pace for two reasons: firstly, people now have access to newer resources such as modern medicines and are no longer as dependent on local medicinal plants and animals as before; and secondly, people are increasingly losing control over the local resource base, with takeovers by state and corporate interests (Gadgil and Berkes 1991) . However, folk knowledge and wisdom, with their detailed locality-and time-specific content, are of value in many contexts. They must therefore be supported in two ways: by creating more formal institutions for their maintenance and, most importantly, by creating new contexts for their continued practice (Gadgil et al. 1993 ). The program of "People's Biodiversity Registers" (PBR) is such an attempt.
It is a program of documenting how lay people, primarily rural and forest-dwelling communities, understand living organisms and their ecological setting. The information recorded relates to present status as well as changes over recent years in distribution and abundance; factors affecting distribution and abundance, including habitat transformations and harvests; known uses; and economic transactions involving these organisms. The document also records the perceptions of local people about ongoing ecological changes, their own development aspirations, and their preferences as to how they would like the living resources and habitats to be managed. We summarize here our experience of developing the concept and organizing the preparation of 52 such PBRs in different parts of India, the resultant understanding, and the interest that this program has generated ). We believe that the PBR process, involving a collaboration between people working in the organized sector (e.g., educational institutions, government agencies, and NGOs) and the practical ecologists, peasants, herders, fishers, and traditional healers (all in the unorganized sector), is as significant as the product: the recorded information. A subset of the information collected, especially that pertaining to medicinal and other economic uses, has been recorded by ethnobiologists working in academic institutions and for the pharmaceutical industry and other commercial interests (Reid et al. 1993 , Martin 1995 . In this process, however, the local people are treated as anonymous informants; they receive no particular credit for their knowledge, and the information is accumulated with little reference to particular localities and times (Posey and Dutfield 1996) . The PBR process, on the other hand, aims to record the information with full acknowledgment of the source; it thereby serves as a possible means of sharing of benefits that may flow from further economic utilization of such information. Another subset of the information recorded in PBRs is collected during "Participatory Rural Appraisal" (PRA) exercises (Chambers 1992, 1993) that feed into decentralized development planning. Generating good information for such participatory development is also an objective of PBRs; the PBRs differ from PRAs in their greater emphasis on recording all pertinent knowledge, including changes over the recent past, and in giving specific credit for the information collected. Although we have so far completed only one round of PBRs in any one locality, we expect it eventually to become an ongoing process of monitoring ecological change and generating the necessary information for locally adaptive management of living resources.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
The People's Biodiversity Register Programme was initiated by the Foundation for Revitalization of Local Health Traditions as a program focused on documenting community-based knowledge of medicinal plants and their uses, through a workshop held at the Indian Institute of Science, Bangalore in April 1995 . Workers from voluntary agencies participating in this workshop went on to compile, by mid-1996, what were termed Community Biodiversity Registers at 24 sites distributed over 10 states of India. This experience suggested that it would be desirable to broaden the scope of the exercise to all elements of biodiversity, and to record knowledge and perceptions at all levels, from individuals, households, and ethnic groups to multiethnic communities. Thus, name of the program was modified to People's Biodiversity Register. A second workshop to explore this broader approach was organized at Supegaon in Maharashtra in August 1995. This was followed by initiation of PBR activities at 10 sites in four states of the Western Ghats region, as a part of the Western Ghats Biodiversity Network Programme . These experiences laid the foundation of the current set of PBR preparation at 52 sites in eight states as a part of the Biodiversity Conservation Prioritization Programme of the World Wide Fund for Nature-India ). The focus of this program is on the conservation priorities and preferred strategies of the local people. The account that follows primarily refers to the third phase.
This program was initiated through a workshop held in March 1996 at the Indian Institute of Science, Bangalore, involving potential collaborators from the states of Himachal Pradesh, Rajasthan, Bihar, Assam, Orissa, Karnataka, Maharashtra, and the Union Territory of Andaman and Nicobar Islands. These eight regions were selected to provide a good sample of the varied ecological and social regimes of the subcontinent. Discussions at this workshop permitted a crystallization of the methodology and drafting of a methodology manual termed Srishtigyan (Hindi: Srishti, nature; Gyan, knowledge). There followed a series of further training programs and workshops that have facilitated the fieldwork spread over 52 sites throughout the subcontinent, employing a common methodology. The first task of the state-level coordinators was to select the individual study sites that would represent the entire spectrum of ecological and social regimes within the state ( Fig. 1 and Table 1 ). The 52 study localities cover all of the bioclimatic zones of the country (Gadgil and Meher-Homji 1990): tropical wet (18 sites), tropical moist (16), tropical dry (6), tropical semiarid (4), subtropical (4), temperate (3), and alpine (1). They also cover a whole range of ecosystem types: forest (30), pastures (8), wetlands (14), degraded forests (3), agriculture (33), horticulture (8), and deserts (3). Sixteen of the study areas are protected: six national parks and 10 wildlife sanctuaries, three of which are tiger reserves and two are bird sanctuaries.
After study areas were selected, field investigators were chosen from among college-or university-level science teachers or workers of rural development or environment-oriented NGOs. Many of these people are from nearby localities, and have considerable previous familiarity with the study sites. The field investigating teams worked closely with, and often included, some of the local residents. Of the 52 principal investigators of the program, 14 were college teachers, two university teachers, and two school teachers. 
RESULTS

Living resources
Many widespread trends are evident in the 52 PBRs representing the entire spectrum of ecoclimatic and so- cioeconomic conditions of this diverse country. Agricultural production, especially of cereal grains, has increased over India as a whole, as has the production of wood from eucalyptus, poplar, and Acacia auriculiformis plantations. Fish and shrimp production has also increased under aquaculture. These increases result from intensification of inputs and management. Outside such managed ecosystems, however, there has been widespread decline in both productivity and diversity of living resources. Such decline can be traced to a variety of factors: breakdown of social regulation of harvesting regimes; escalation in demand, well beyond the productive capacity of the resources, for meeting subsistence and market demands; deterioration in the productive capacity of resources attributed to adverse environmental changes such as pollution and siltation; and diversion of the land to other purposes such as mining and road construction. We may cite here two examples of the breakdown in social regulation, one related to a breakdown of community-level understanding, and the other to a breakdown of localized authority. First, along several streams in the mountainous state of Himachal Pradesh, people used to observe a system of sacred pools called machiyals, where no fishing was permitted. This system of refugia promoted long-term persistence of fish populations fished elsewhere along the stream (Gokhale et al. 1998 ). Establishment of road communications has now rendered many parts of the state accessible to outsiders, such as military personnel who do not respect the protection to the machiyals. Simultaneously, road construction activity has led to widespread availability of dynamite, which is used for highly destructive fishing by such outsiders. This has led to considerable depletion of fish populations along these streams.
The second example comes from the semiarid and arid state of Rajasthan, where extensive areas adjacent to villages were protected as sacred groves or orans, subject to highly regulated harvests, primarily of dead wood and fodder. These regulations were enforced by the village landlord families, mostly belonging to the dominant Rajput castes, until the land reforms around 1970. The orans were taken over as government property during land reforms. However, the government machinery did not act as an effective regulatory authority, so that most orans have become open-access resources subject to unregulated harvests, except for special cases such as Doli, which will be discussed.
Examples of excessive levels of harvests depleting already dwindling living resources of the public lands are part of every one of the PBRs. Resources so depleted include fuelwood, grazing, small timber for house construction, grass and palm leaves for thatching roofs, and medicinal plants. One The governmental agencies that control the public land and water resources more and more tightly have responded to this erosion of living resources by further restricting people's access without being equally effective in restricting the access of well-organized commercial interests. Thus, access to the Bharatpur National Park by Aghapur villagers has been strongly restricted, whereas the Darlaghat Wildlife Sanctuary in Himachal Pradesh was delisted to facilitate the creation of cement plants.
Our PBRs do not, however, merely record instances of the degradation of living resources of public lands and waters. Two of the PBRs, pertaining to Doli village in Rajasthan and Dhani village in Orissa, record examples of the spontaneous establishment of regimes of regulated use, leading to resource recovery. The restrictions in Doli are the result of religious sentiments of a Hindu sect, the Bishnois, whose precepts call for protection of several species of plants and animals. At their instance, the local sacred grove (oran) has been well protected over the last 25 years (Gokhale et al. 1998 ). In the primarily tribal village of Dhani, the people on their own initiative have established a forest protection committee and have ensured excellent natural regeneration of the forest. We will discuss the Dhani experience further.
Practical ecological knowledge
People's dependence on living resources has declined along with the decline in ready availability of such resources to them. At the same time, people have access to new resources that can substitute, e.g., allopathic drugs in place of herbal remedies, tiles in place of thatching for roof, or synthetic dyes in place of vegetable dyes. This has led to a decline in interest, among the younger geneation, in the knowledge of living resources, a decline reinforced by the modern, largely bookish system of education. Our PBR studies reflect such decline in knowledge. In Kaihad village in Himachal Pradesh, residents as a whole know of -450 The starting point of the PBR exercise is to classify the concerned human population into "user groups" on the basis of their relation to natural, particularly, living, resources. Thus, cultivators owning sufficiently large tracts of land to fulfill their household biomass requirements may constitute one group; landless agricultural laborers dependent on public lands for their biomass requirements, such as fuelwood or dung, and on weaving baskets or mats for employment in the nonagricultural season, may constitute a second group, and specialist herders a third group. Within households, women assume greater responsibility for fuel and fodder collection than men; hence, women from poor, landless families may constitute a distinct user group. PBRs show that greater dependence on living resources is also accompanied by much greater knowledge. For instance, in Shilimb village in Maharashtra, 13 distinct endogamous groups fall into five major user groups. Brahmins are substantial landowners and traders, Katkaris are landless agricultural laborers, Dhangars are specialist herders, and the other 10 endogamous groups are divided into cultivators with medium-sized holdings and artisans. As Table 2 shows, Katkaris are by far more knowledgeable about uses of plant species. As may be expected, they are also reported to be the user group to suffer most from a degradation of the living resources of Shilimb. Similarly disadvantaged user groups are susceptible everywhere to suffering most from greater loss of access to public lands and water. For instance, similar groups in several PBR sites from Palamu National Park in Bihar are currently being asked to move out of their century-old settlement sites within forest areas.
Motivation
The PBR exercise involved recording the development aspirations of all of the different user groups at different sites. The citizens of India today uniformly equate development with higher incomes and upward social mobility. Everywhere, the wealthy and the powerful have better access to transport and communication, health care, education, and water for household use and irrigation; all segments of society aspire for enhanced access to these resources as the core of development. In contrast, the people most dependent on and knowledgeable about biodiversity are, without exception, the poorest and least powerful. Better access to biodiversity resources and their conservation therefore tend to be viewed as (no doubt) desirable, but certainly not an integral component of development aspirations. Almost no segment of the rural population today is strongly motivated to organize and participate in efforts at conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity.
The PBRs also record the perceptions of the rural population about the current role and motivation of other major agents influencing the living resources, namely government agencies such as forest departments, and traders and industry. The government agencies are reported as being self-serving, corrupt, and inefficient, the commercial interests as being motivated to pursue short-term profits. None of these agents are reported to be motivated to promote long-term conservation and sustainable-use objectives. 
Resultant conflicts
Lessons learned
PBRs include a discussion with the different user groups and with the village assembly as a whole on their prescriptions as to how the living resources should be managed. Although, as previously noted, the villagers do not include programs for conservation and sustainable use of these resources as a part of their development aspirations, they uniformly note their unhappiness at the deterioration of this resource base. Their prescriptions for its good management overwhelmingly call for empowerment of local communities to play this role. They are, however, clear that local communities cannot on their own shoulder the responsibility; they need to be supported in many ways. Such support is needed to resolve conflicts within the village society, with neighboring villages, and with commercial interests and the government agencies. All PBRs therefore suggest the institution of some form of comanagement, co-operative arrangements among villagers, local educational institutions, NGOs, and government agencies. There is considerable variation from user groups, from village to village, and from one part of the country to the other, in the form of the suggested institutions.
Designing institutions
Given the broad consensus on the desirability of organizing community-based management systems, the various suggestions are best examined in the context of Ostrom's (1990, 1992) seven principles of design of long-enduring, self-organized systems. Clearly, it is not feasible to establish fully autonomous, self-organized systems on any widespread scale in the present-day Indian context (Gokhale et al. 1998) . That is why the PBRs call for systems of co-management involving substantial support by government agencies to the community-based institutions as the appropriate arrangement (Gadgil and Rao 1995). Ostrom's principles provide useful pointers to the most important areas in which local communities need to be supported by the state apparatus and other agencies, such as educational institutions and NGOs, to create viable decentralized institutions of management of natural resources.
Principle I.-Boundaries of the managed resource should be well defined, and such a resource should be under the reasonably secure control of a well-defined human group.
At present, the living resources on public lands and waters are under the control of state agencies with boundaries defined by a system of land settlement as revenue lands, reserve forests, irrigation tanks, and so on. However, the state agencies have a far from secure control over these resources, many of which are subject to abuse as open-access resources. In their stead, a new, decentralized system of governance called Panchayat Raj, with elected representatives from the level of village councils upward, is being put in place all over India (Singh 1994 ). Many user groups support such an alternative arrangement; others express some doubts as to its efficacy. The unwillingness of government agencies to give up their own powers and to place resources under the secure control of Panchayat Raj institutions seems to be a major difficulty. Other problems arise in the case of fugitive resources, e.g., river water affected by upstream influences such as water withdrawal or pollution. PBRs emphasize the need to set up proper machinery to resolve such cross-border conflicts.
Principle II.-Groups responsible for resource management should be effectively organized.
Our PBRs record several misgivings about the efficacy of Panchayat Raj institutions to manage the living resources of public lands and waters. In part, these relate to the large number of people, on the order of 10000, within the boundary of a panchayat. Self-organized management institutions are much more effective when they involve smaller, more homogeneous groups in face-to-face contact. Therefore, people in many of the study localities suggest that parallel committees representing smaller groups, working as subsidiary bodies of Panchayat Raj institutions, are more appropriate to take on tasks of natural resource management.
Principle III.-Long-term benefits of conservation measures should be commensurate with the costs incurred.
Conservation measures entail certain restraints on the immediate use of resources, or on conversion of the land or water areas to alternative uses. These would imply certain opportunity costs. Conservation measures may also entail other costs such as crop depredation and killing of livestock or even of people by wild animals. These costs need to be effectively offset by benefits, which would generally be realized in the longer term. Furthermore, the costs would not be borne, nor would the benefits flow, equally to the different user groups. Management needs to be tailored to the time, locality, and society-specific conditions. The PBRs bring this out well. For example, Himachal Pradesh sites might require rather special arrangements with nomadic herders who visit annually; these are irrelevant to other sites. Even with such flexible arrangements, the benefits may not be adequate to offset costs. Many PBRs therefore propose additional benefits, in the form of either social recognition or financial incentives. Thus, the village Doli in Rajasthan, which protects a large sacred grove with a substantial population of antelopes that inflict much damage on crops, may deserve payment of an annual service charge in recognition of its contribution to nature conservation. Such a service charge may take the form of a special annual grant by the Rajasthan State Government to the village council concerned.
Principle IV.-Machinery enforcing the observance of management rules should be accountable to, and respected by, the actors.
Government agencies such as the Forest Department today are in charge of monitoring observance of resource use regulations, except in a few special cases such as the Doli village in Rajasthan. All of our PBRs suggest that this machinery is viewed to be self-serving, corrupt and inefficient, in no way accountable to people. Suggested alternatives include committees of local people working with a transparently functioning, and people-oriented government machinery, assisted by local educational institutions and NGOs.
Principle V.-Agreements should be arrived at on the basis of collective choice.
Currently, the resource use prescriptions are imposed from outside by a government apparatus that has no accountability toward local communities. All of our PBRs propose that this be replaced by a process in which the local community is actively involved in consultation with concerned government agencies and other actors such as educational institutions.
Principle VI.-The management rules should be flexible.
Principle VII.-Sanctions against those violating the rules should be imposed in a graduated fashion.
The centralized management agencies tend to impose uniform and rigid rules and sanctions against violations. All of our PBR exercises point to the need for flexibility and fine-tuning to the specific situation. An excellent example of this is provided by the working of the Forest Protection Committee formed at the initiative of people from a cluster of five villages around Dhani in Nayagarh district of Orissa. This management system was initiated in 1986 in response to extensive degradation of forest stock under government management. To begin with, the Forest Protection Committee banned all collection of forest produce, as well as grazing and encroachment for cultivation, in the 800-ha plot. Initially, fines for violation were collected on the basis of the kind of produce extracted. After two years of strict protection, the forest began to regenerate and the Forest Protection Committee decided to permit extraction of leaves and fruits and grazing by livestock. After a further period of regeneration, there was further relaxation, permitting collection of fuelwood for household needs, but without any felling of green trees. At the same time, a few of the poorest families are now allowed to collect a limited quantity of fuelwood for sale as well.
ADAPTIVE CO-MANAGEMENT
The very broad consensus from our PBR exercises is the need to establish community-based systems of resource management supported by, and working in collaboration with, concerned governmental agencies, educational institutions, and where appropriate, NGOs. There is also a clear endorsement of the need for these management systems to be flexible and tailored to specific situations. Such systems may be termed as systems of adaptive co-management (Walters and Hilborn 1976). The process of preparation of PBRs, as well as the product (the record created), emerge as very useful devices in such adaptive co-management systems (Anonymous 1996) . The value of the PBR process is exemplified by an experience in the village Nanj from the Karsog study area of Himachal Pradesh. The village was an active participant in the literacy movement during 1992-1993 and the people were exposed to a variety of issues relating to natural resource management. As a consequence, there was consensus to enclose a heavily degraded patch of forest. Regeneration on this patch has been extremely promising. During the literacy campaign, a blackboard was painted on a wall at a public place in the village for open classes and dissemination of information. Over the last few years, it had fallen into disuse, but it was revived during the PBR documentation to display the information collected, leading to public debates on the issues and, in turn, to conservation actions.
One such debate centered around the species kambal (Rhus wallichi, Hook. f.), a multipurpose tree found up to the mid-Himalayas, considered to be a good source of fuelwood and green manure. It was pointed, using the blackboard, that excessive pressure of both fuelwood and manure collection had reduced the kambal to a bush in the forest, leading to declining availability of both fuelwood and manure. After many days of discussion in front of the blackboard, it was decided that leaf manure for ginger was a higher priority. As other fuelwood species were available in the forest, it was agreed to restrict the extraction of kambal to leaves for green manure, with bushes pruned in such a way that one or two shoots would be permitted to grow. At the same time, a few progressive farmers decided to experiment with agricultural crop residues as a substitute for kambal leaves for manure. Over one year, they dem- onstrated that there was no difference in the yields from the two kinds of manure; subsequently, more farmers turned to crop residues as this meant lower labor inputs. As a consequence, kambal is now flourishing in the forest and through careful pruning and good rootsrock, it will grow back to tree size in a few years. The documentation of natural resources, the history of their use, people's development aspirations, ongoing difficulties in resource management in the form of manifold conflicts, and people's prescriptions on how the resources should be managed are clearly very pertinent inputs for any system of adaptive co-management. The PBR of Berhampur village near Chilika in Orissa furnishes an interesting example of such a product. Chilika, the largest brackish-water lagoon in south and southeast Asia, is under manifold threats. These arise because of the escalating pressures on natural resources: forests in the catchment that have been felled, surrounding fields that are sprayed with pesticides, or fish stocks that are caught in increasing numbers with mechanized boats and fine-meshed nylon nets. It is obviously impractical to think of going back to the old days when most resources were used far less intensively. However it is essential to manage the resources far more carefully.
In this, practical ecologists, such as the fisherfolk of Chilika, can provide valuable inputs, for they are the people with a serious long-term stake in the health of their environment. Table 3 Obviously, Hoechst would pay very many people like Moolya small sums like Rs. 220, and then pool together all the information generated with other public knowledge (such as of Ayurveda) and inputs from many scientific disciplines, to eventually develop a small number of products (Sukh Dev 1997). The process may take many years, perhaps decades, and particular pieces of information provided by a specific individual may or may not yield any product. In any case, every product will use many other inputs in its development. It is therefore difficult to design a system of either regulating collection and use of such knowledge, or ensuring payment of royalty to a particular individual in case his/her knowledge provided an important clue. Furthermore, because much of such knowledge is part of shared cultural resources, there are questions of whether it is appropriate to reward any particular individual who may by chance have been the person to communicate a specific piece of information.
Given these complexities, our approach was to put on record only such information as was voluntarily disclosed by people without any persuasion on the part of investigators. Beyond this, other information was maintained off the formal record as claims, for example, that a particular person in village Kigga of Karnataka has an herbal remedy against snakebite. Such broad claims could subsequently be made public and may attract entrepreneurs to directly contact the claimants. The two parties may then negotiate terms under which the information may be revealed. Elsewhere in the world, innovative experiments of recording such exclusive, undisclosed information through various types of contracts are being initiated (Glowka 1998) . In Eucador, a project by the Inter-American Development Bank attempts to computerize traditional knowledge, segregated according to communities. The database manager, a local NGO, compares this with the public-domain knowledge listed in the NAPRALERT database housed at University of Chicago, Chicago, Illinois, USA.
Knowledge not yet in the public domain is treated as trade secrets, and is transferred to potential users directly by the corresponding community or an intermediary, through agreements. Further, the NA-PRALERT information that is unavailable to the people is also repatriated. On the other hand, know-how licenses are negotiated between Aguaruna people from Peru and Searle and Company, the pharmaceutical division.of Monsanto, irrespective of whether or not the knowledge was in the public domain. The license brings the Aguaruna collection fees, annual know-how license fees, and milestone payments as the research progresses. The Aguaruna are also trained locally and in the university, are kept informed of the research progress, and retain all the rights to resources as well as the right to terminate the license. The Costa Rica Biodiversity Act also proposes a national registry of traditional knowledge. However, this will be used only to deny intellectual property rights to innovations with similar applications (Dutfield G. personal communication). In this case, the incentive for the people to record their knowledge is not obvious.
Apart from such one-to-one deals involving intellectual property rights, PBRs may also serve as a tool of conserving and respecting folk knowledge, and rewarding through a different route, namely a system of awards linked to the quality of documentation of knowledge through PBRs (Gadgil 1997 ). The state, international agencies such as UNEP or UNESCO, or private foundations may come forward to periodically reward the communities, in terms of special development grants and social recognition for excellence in documenting such folk knowledge. This would help to conserve such knowledge through creation of more permanent records, as well as to encourage the younger generation to acquire and keep it alive (Anonymous 1996) .
Prospects
The experience of preparing these 52 PBRs has been most positive, with considerable enthusiasm generated among teachers and students in educational institutions, among NGO activists, and among members of local communities. An account of the experience appeared in the Annual Survey of Environment for 1998 published by Hindu, one of the leading English-language newspapers of south India . A large number of people from all over India have expressed an interest in undertaking PBR exercises in their own area, as a result of this exposure. Similar interest has been expressed from Brazil and South Africa as well. More concretely, the government of India, in its draft biodiversity act (Anonymous 1998) tabled in the parliament session during April 1999, has specifically entrusted to the village councils the responsibility of documenting biodiversity resources, knowledge, and conservation efforts. Further, the bill provides for direct sharing of royalties from the commercial application with the individual or group of people only if the exclusiveness of the knowledge or resources that they provided can be ascertained. In all other cases, part of the benefits generated from commercial application of biodiversity and related knowledge would be deposited in a national fund. This national fund would be used primarily for rewarding and encouraging conservation efforts and knowledge contributions. Although the bill does not specifically mention the village documents as the basis for benefit sharing, it would eventually become imperative for the government to do so. Interestingly enough, without waiting for the government initiative to take off, the NGO group that coordinated this exercise in the state of Himachal Pradesh is seriously pursuing a follow-up, with many more PBRs being prepared throughout the state, primarily as a tool for adaptive co-management. A similar effort is on in 60 panchayats in the district Ernakulam of Kerala. This would be part of the vigorous attempt to decentralize development planning in the state. Other NGO groups from Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh are also preparing PBRs in several villages, with the expectation that these would also serve to protect people's rights over resources and knowledge. We are attempting to computerize the information contained in PBRs and to develop systems of synthesizing this information at higher spatial scales, such as districts and states. Eventually, the relevant, spatially aggregated information can be fed back to people so that they can benefit from learning about uses, trade value, or conservation efforts in other areas. In the long run, we have every hope that PBRs will evolve into a useful tool supporting a process of community-based management of living resources, contributing to conservation, and the rewarding of folk knowledge.
